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It is important that engineering and management accept the need for an availability 
requirement that is derived with its influencing attributes. It is the intent of this paper to 
provide the visibility of relationships of these major attribute drivers (variables) to each 
other and the resultant system inherent availability. Also important to provide bounds of the 
variables providing engineering the insight required to control the system’s engineering 
solution, e.g., these influencing attributes become design requirements also. These variables 
will drive the need to provide integration of similar discipline functions or technology 
selection to allow control of the total parts count. The relationship of selecting a reliability 
requirement will place a constraint on parts count to achieve a given availability 
requirement or if allowed to increase the parts count will drive the system reliability 
requirement higher. They also provide the understanding for the relationship of mean repair 
time (or mean down time) to maintainability, e.g., accessibility for repair, and both the mean 
time between failure, e.g., reliability of hardware and availability. The concerns and 
importance of achieving a strong availability requirement is driven by the need for 
affordability, the choice of using the two launch solution for the single space application, or 
the need to control the spare parts count needed to support the long stay in either orbit or on 
the surface of the moon. Understanding the requirements before starting the architectural 
design concept will avoid considerable time and money required to iterate the design to meet 
the redesign and assessment process required to achieve the results required of the 
customer’s space transportation system. In fact the impact to the schedule to being able to 
deliver the system that meets the customer’s needs, goals, and objectives may cause the 
customer to compromise his desired operational goal and objectives resulting in considerable 
increased life cycle cost of the fielded space transportation system.                                                                                 
Nomenclature 
Ai = inherent availability 
Aa = achieved availability 
Ao = operational availability  
MTBF = mean time between failure  
MTTR = mean time to repair  
λ = failure rate or the reciprocal of the MTBF 
r = number of failures or repairs 
N = total parts count 
t = system exposure time  
Pr = probability  
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I. Introduction 
T is essential that management and engineering understand the need for a derived availability requirement for the 
customer’s space transportation system. It is also essential to provide engineering and management the visibility 
of the several variables that determine availability required to enable a system’s key goals and objectives. This 
relationship of the variables driving the availability-capability needs must be understood by all decision makers 
involved. This paper will address the inherent availability which only addresses the mean downtime as that mean 
time to repair or the time to determine the failed article, remove it, install a replacement article, and verify the 
functionality of the repaired system. Also with inherent availability the mean uptime will only consider the mean 
time between failures (for example, another form of availability addresses mean time between maintenance that 
includes both preventive and corrective maintenance) that require the repair of the system to be functional. It is also 
essential that management and engineering understand all influencing attribute relationships to each other and to the 
resultant inherent-availability requirement. Fig.1 illustrates the influences these attribute relationships to each other 
and to the resultant availability requirement. This visibility will provide the decision makers with the understanding 
necessary to place constraints on the design definition for the major drivers that will determine the inherent 
availability, safety, reliability, maintainability, and the life cycle cost of the fielded system provided to the customer. 
This inherent availability requirement may be driven by the need to use a multiple launch approach to placing 
humans on the moon or the desire to control the number of spare parts required to support long stays in either orbit 
or on the surface of the moon or mars.  
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Figure 1. Availability influence diagram 
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II. Background 
Availability is the probability that a repairable system is operational—thus, availability is a function of both 
reliability and maintainability. Reliability is the probability a system will perform its intended function without 
failure for a specified period of time under specified conditions. Maintainability is the probability of restoring or 
repairing a system within a period of time when maintenance is performed in accordance with prescribed 
procedures. 
 
Availability and not reliability addresses downtime (i.e., time for maintenance, repair, and replacement 
activities). As with reliability, availability can be either a demonstrated or predictive measure of performance. 
Demonstrated availability is simply (uptime) / (uptime + downtime). Predictive availability has three types, namely, 
at time t (point availability), over an interval from t1 to t2 (interval availability), or over the long run as t → ∞ 
(steady-state availability).   
 
Steady-state availability has three common forms (with each depending on the definitions of uptime and 
downtime), namely, inherent availability (Ai), achieved availability (Aa), and operational availability (Ao). Inherent 
availability is based solely on the failure (reliability) distribution and the downtime (maintainability) distribution and 
is an important system parameter for concept-architectural-design definition through systems-trade studies. 
 
The maintainability parameter of inherent availability only accounts for the time to diagnose and locate the failed 
article, access and repair it, and verify the functionality of the repaired system. The maintainability parameter for 
achieved availability is the same as inherent availability except it includes the time for preventive maintenance. Last, 
the maintainability parameter for operational availability is the same as achieved availability except it includes the 
time for logistics and administrative delays. 
 
For the purpose of this paper we will only discuss inherent availability (Ai) as shown in Eq. 1, 
 
  Ai = MTBF / (MTBF + MTTR)                                                            (1) 
 
where MTBF is the mean time between failure and MTTR is the mean time to repair. That is, MTBF is the average 
time between system failures (i.e., the average time the system performs its intended function), and MTTR is the 
average down time (i.e., the time to identify and access the failed article, repair or replace the article, and verify the 
functionality of the repaired system). Stating an availability requirement by itself will not accomplish the 
requirement’s intent. Why, because there are three major drivers that influence and enable the achievement of the 
availability requirement. These drivers are reliability, maintainability, and total parts count (formerly referred to as 
“system element count”). The availability requirement and the mentioned drivers must be developed and linked 
together to form interdependent requirements. The relationship of these drivers and the desired level of inherent 
availability must be understood by both engineering and management to systematically achieve the customer’s 
needs and goals.  
III. Understanding the Availability and its Drivers 
A. Inherent Availability and its Influencing Attributes 
We will address inherent availability from a design perspective. By emphasizing the importance of the key 
attributes that influence availability, we can control the need to perform unplanned work during long space missions 
or during the critical phases of the launch operation. Since inherent availability is a mathematical function of MTBF 
and MTTR, availability is determined by both parameters (drivers) and not one. Thus, reliability and its common 
metric (MTBF) do not equate to availability. As MTBF increases, upper-bound MTTR increases for lower-bound 
availability requirement. Therefore, if the mission cannot accommodate the amount of down time from the predicted 
MTTR requirement, there is a need for selecting a higher availability requirement. If the opposite approach is taken 
to reduce MTBF in order to reduce the allowable MTTR, the probability of the number of failures would increase 
resulting in more replacement parts and the same total down time. However, the impact to the mission will be much 
greater. That is, there would be a greater burden on logistics and higher life cycle cost due to the increased demand 
in providing more parts. Table 1 below illustrates this relationship between the requirements for MTTR and MTBF 
for different availability requirements. This table assumes there is one system element with a mission time of one 
unit (hours will be used in this paper) and with failures occurring at a constant rate. 
 
Table 1. Availability requirement as a function of the reliability requirement and maintainability                    
 requirement for a fixed mission time  
 
90% 94% 98% 99% 99.50% 99.90%
0.9500 2.17             1.24         0.40         0.20        0.10         0.02        19.496
0.9800 5.50             3.16         1.01         0.50        0.25         0.05        49.498
0.9900 11.06           6.35         2.03         1.01        0.50         0.10        99.499
0.9940 18.46           10.61       3.39         1.68        0.84         0.17        166.166
0.9950 22.17           12.73       4.07         2.02        1.00         0.20        199.500
0.9960 27.72           15.93       5.09         2.52        1.25         0.25        249.500
0.9980 55.50           31.88       10.19       5.05        2.51         0.50        499.500
0.9990 111.06         63.80       20.40       10.10      5.02         1.00        999.500
0.9998 555.50         319.12     102.03     50.50      25.12       5.00        4999.500
0.9999 1,111.06      638.27     204.07     101.01    50.25       10.01      9999.500
System
Reliability 
MTBF =
 -1/ln R
Availability (A)
MTTR (Hours)  
 
To understand the relationship between increased hardware failures and reduced reliability, we will examine the 
probability of failure, total parts count, and system reliability. The Poisson distribution can be used to predict the 
exact number of repair or failure events (r) in time period (t) of interest. However, it assumes each part has a 
constant repair or failure rate λ (where λ is the reciprocal of MTBF) and is immediately repaired or replaced. When 
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the forecast is to determine the likelihood of r or less number of failures, the cumulative Poisson distribution can be 
used to determine this probability (Pr) and is described in Eq 2 
   
( ) ( )0Pr / !r nN tn e N t nλ λ−= ⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦∑                                                                     (2) 
 
where r is the upper bound for the number of failures, N is the total parts count under consideration, λ is the failure 
rate, and t is time period of interest. Using Eq. 2 and Table 2 illustrate the relationship between system complexity 
(parts count) and system reliability where Table 2 provides the visibility for the predicted probability of success of 
controlling the part failures during the period of time of interest. This methodology can be used during design for 
controlling predicted hardware failures. This methodology places a bound on parts count to system reliability being 
selected. 
                                  
Table 2. System Complexity (parts count) shown as a function system reliability and probability of 1 or     
       less failures (events) per one hour time period (mission) 
2,000
1
1
1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 5,000 10,000 20,000
0.940
0.945
0.950
0.955
0.960
0.965
0.970
0.975
0.980
0.985
0.990
And:
System 
Reliability 
( R )
 System 
MTBF
Element 
Failure Rate 
(λi)
16.2 3.0938E-05 0.99953 0.99896 0.99816 0.99716 0.98920 0.96096 0.87189
17.7 2.8285E-05 0.99961 0.99913 0.99846 0.99761 0.99089 0.96680 0.88926
19.5 2.5647E-05 0.99968 0.99928 0.99873 0.99803 0.99245 0.97223 0.90585
21.7 2.3022E-05 0.99974 0.99942 0.99897 0.99841 0.99386 0.97724 0.92155
24.5 2.0411E-05 0.99979 0.99954 0.99919 0.99874 0.99513 0.98180 0.93623
28.1 1.7814E-05 0.99984 0.99965 0.99938 0.99904 0.99626 0.98590 0.94977
32.8 1.5230E-05 0.99989 0.99974 0.99955 0.99929 0.99724 0.98952 0.96204
39.5 1.2659E-05 0.99992 0.99982 0.99968 0.99951 0.99808 0.99263 0.97288
49.5 1.0101E-05 0.99995 0.99989 0.99980 0.99969 0.99877 0.99523 0.98214
66.2 7.5568E-06 0.99997 0.99994 0.99989 0.99982 0.99930 0.99728 0.98967
99.5 5.0252E-06 0.99999 0.99997 0.99995 0.99992 0.99969 0.99878 0.99528
IF: Proposed System Has Serial Element Count (N) =
Mission Time (t) =
Mission's Maximum Failure Count (r) = 
Then: Probability Of Success: Failure Count Is r Or Less During t For Various System Complexity Levels (Nref) Based On λi 
 
 
When evaluating total parts count, this can be considered in two different ways. If the concern is for 
affordability, the total parts count considers all components that could be considered to have a failure mode. Any 
part failure will result in added maintenance burden and result in added life cycle cost. However, if the concern is 
for achieving a successful launch on time or for the in-space application for long term space flight, only the critical 
components (parts) should be considered that would impact the successful mission accomplishment. Because of this 
difference in objectives, the designer will probably want to perform both evaluations to allow the achievement of 
both objectives which can be controlled and accomplished by the design process. These attribute relationships and 
availability can be made more visible by examining scenario examples. 
B. An example of Space Transportation Application 
Let’s work an example case through this process to allow better visibility of using these aids. Let’s assume for a 
repairable system the requirements are a 45-day period (1080 hours) with 0.98 system reliability, 98% system 
availability, and upper-bound MTTR at 216 hours. This 45-day target may represent a desired total time for 
receiving the hardware at the launch site, integrating the major elements, servicing the consumables, installing and 
connecting any ordinance, and launching the space transportation system into space (including approximately 20% 
for hardware replacement, e.g., MTTR). We can see from Table 3 that the upper bound MTTR for our example is 
1090.98 hours. However, we must either select a higher availability or lower system reliability since the calculated 
upper-bound MTTR greatly exceeds the 216-hour requirement. Again using Table 3 when we do not change the 
0.98 system reliability requirement, the availability requirement needs to be adjusted upwards to be ~ 99.9% 
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providing an upper-bound MTTR of 53.51 hours. The other option would be to reduce system reliability to 0.90 to 
retain the upper-bound MTTR requirement of 216 hours. However, when we select a lower reliability, we need to 
address the likelihood (probability) of experiencing additional hardware failures. It can be seen from Table 4 that the 
system complexity requirement would be constrained to ~ 10,765 critical parts count maximum at a 98% or better 
probability of success while predicting the failures to be 2 or less parts per event. However, the upper-bound MTTR 
for these 2 parts will only be ~ 209 hours to achieve the availability of 98%. This option can be compared to the 
reliability choice of 0.98 where the critical parts constraint would be ~ 56,125 vs. the 10,765 with the reliability 
reduction to 0.90. 
 
Table 3. Availability shown highlighted as a function of system reliability and mean time to repair in   
      hours 
  Availability (A) = Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) / (MTBF + Mean Time To Repair (MTTR))
  A = MTBF / (MTBF+MTTR)     or     MTTR = MTBF(1-A / A)           t = 1080 Hours
A family of curves can be created for A = 90% to 99.9% with Sys. Reliability (R) = 0.95 to 0.99996
Then MTTR is calculated for @ each A value 
90% 98% 99% 99.50% 99.90% 99.98% 99.996%
0.9000 1,138.95         209.19         103.54          51.51           10.26        2.05         0.410 10250.52
0.9800 5,939.80         1,090.98      539.98          268.63         53.51        10.69       2.138 53458.18
0.9900 11,939.90       2,193.04      1,085.45       540.00         107.57      21.50       4.299 107459.10
0.9940 19,939.94       3,662.44      1,812.72       901.81         179.64      35.90       7.179 179459.46
0.9950 23,939.95       4,397.13      2,176.36       1,082.71      215.68      43.10       8.619 215459.55
0.9960 29,939.96       5,499.18      2,721.81       1,354.07      269.73      53.90       10.779 269459.64
0.9980 59,939.98       11,009.38    5,449.09       2,710.85      540.00      107.91     21.579 539459.82
0.9990 119,939.99     22,029.79    10,903.64     5,424.42      1,080.54   215.94     43.180 1079459.91
0.9995 239,939.99     44,070.61    21,812.73     10,851.56    2,161.62   431.98     86.382 2159459.95
0.9998 599,940.00     110,193.06  54,540.00     27,132.96    5,404.86   1,080.11  215.987 5399459.98
0.9999 1,199,940.00  220,397.14  109,085.45   54,268.64  10,810.27 2,160.32 431.996 10799459.99
System
Reliability 
MTBF =
 -t/ln R
Availability (A)
MTTR (Hours)        
      
Again it can be seen from Table 4 that it may be desirable to increase system reliability if it is unreasonable to 
constrain the parts count below ~56,125 with a probability of success greater than ~ 98%. If we select system 
reliability greater than 0.98 to accommodate an increased parts count constraint, we will again need to reassess the 
availability requirement value for 99.9% to retain the MTTR requirement to ~ 216 hours. Attention should be paid 
to the element (part) failure rate requirement to attain these system reliability values to assure they are obtainable. 
  
Table 4. System Complexity (parts count) constraint example shown as a function of system reliability  
      (0.90 & 0.98) and 98% probability of success of controlling failures to 2 or less / event 
2,000
1,080
2
1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 5,000 10,765 56,125
0.900
0.945
0.950
0.955
0.960
0.965
0.970
0.975
0.980
0.985
0.990
And:
System 
Reliability 
( R )
System 
MTBF
Element 
Failure Rate 
(λi)
10,250.5 4.8778E-08 0.99998 0.99992 0.99982 0.99965 0.99750 0.98001 0.43297
19,091.3 2.6190E-08 1.00000 0.99999 0.99997 0.99994 0.99958 0.99625 0.78658
21,055.4 2.3747E-08 1.00000 0.99999 0.99998 0.99996 0.99968 0.99714 0.82389
23,455.9 2.1317E-08 1.00000 0.99999 0.99998 0.99997 0.99977 0.99789 0.85893
26,456.3 1.8899E-08 1.00000 1.00000 0.99999 0.99998 0.99984 0.99850 0.89107
30,313.9 1.6494E-08 1.00000 1.00000 0.99999 0.99999 0.99989 0.99898 0.91974
35,457.3 1.4101E-08 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 0.99999 0.99993 0.99935 0.94438
42,657.7 1.1721E-08 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 0.99999 0.99996 0.99962 0.96457
53,458.2 9.3531E-09 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 0.99998 0.99980 0.98002
71,458.6 6.9971E-09 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 0.99999 0.99992 0.99072
107,459.1 4.6529E-09 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 0.99997 0.99697
IF: Proposed System Has Serial Element Count (N) =
Mission Time (t) =
Mission's Maximum Failure Count (r) = 
Then: Probability Of Success: Failure Count Is r Or Less During t For Various System Complexity Levels (Nref) Based On λi 
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For the purposes of determining the availability of the system during a more critical time during the launch 
operation, we provide an assessment of the last 16 hours (two work shifts) of the total 45-day flow time by adjusting 
the value for t in our model to 16 hours. For this evaluation, select a system reliability of 0.98 and the availability of 
0.98% with an upper-bound MTTR value of 5 hour for hardware replacement. It can be seen from Table 6 that a 
reliability value of 0.98 must be selected to achieve a one or less failure prediction within the 16 hours while 
constraining the critical parts count to 21,250 with minimum of a 0.98% probability of success. From Table 5 it can 
be determined with a system reliability value of 0.98 (MTBF of ~ 792 hours) that the availability must be 99.5% to 
constrain the MTTR to within the desired 5 hours. The first selected availability value of 0.98% would have allowed 
the MTTR of ~ 16 hours which is not compatible with our requirement. If it is desirable to increase the critical parts 
constraint above the 21,250, the system reliability requirement may need to be raised to 0.99 at an availability 
requirement of 99.9% to allow constraining the parts failure potential to one element (part) during this final 16 hour 
with a maximum of ~ 5 hours for this repair. 
 
 Table 5. Availability shown highlighted as a function of system reliability and mean time to repair in 
hours 
Availability (A) = Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) / (MTBF + Mean Time To Repair (MTTR))
A = MTBF / (MTBF+MTTR)     or     MTTR = MTBF(1-A / A)           t = 16 Hours
A family of curves can be created for A = 90% to 99.9% with Sys. Reliability (R) = 0.95 to 0.99996
Then MTTR is calculated for @ each A value 
90% 98% 99% 99.50% 99.90% 99.97% 99.994%
0.9500 34.66         6.37          3.15         1.57         0.31        0.09        0.02          311.93
0.9800 88.00         16.16        8.00         3.98       0.79        0.24        0.05          791.97
0.9900 176.89       32.49        16.08       8.00         1.59        0.48        0.10          1591.99
0.9940 295.41       54.26        26.86       13.36       2.66        0.80        0.16          2658.66
0.9950 354.67       65.14        32.24       16.04       3.20        0.96        0.19          3191.99
0.9960 443.55       81.47        40.32       20.06       4.00        1.20        0.24          3991.99
0.9980 888.00       163.10      80.73       40.16       8.00        2.40        0.48          7992.00
0.9990 1,776.89    326.37      161.54     80.36       16.01      4.80        0.96          15992.00
0.9998 8,888.00    1,632.49   808.00     401.97     80.07      24.00      4.80          79992.00
0.99990 17,776.89  3,265.14   1,616.08 803.98   160.15  48.01    9.60         159992.00
System
Reliability 
MTBF =
 -t/ln R
Availability (A)
MTTR (Hours)  
 
 We have discovered from Tables 4 and 6 these element-failure rates may not be achievable; therefore, we will 
address this subject from another perspective. Using Table 7 we will assume a 2000-serial-element count for this 
example and select a reasonable element-failure rate to determine the System MTBF and our probability for success 
of achieving 98% or better for this 16 hour mission when allowing 1 or less failures to occur. From Table 7 it is 
determined that an availability value of 99% can be selected when considering the element-failure rate of 1.5E-06 
while accommodating the 5 hour MTTR requirement. However, from Table 6 we see that the maximum parts count 
is lowered to between 5,000-10,000 elements. 
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 Table 6. System Complexity (parts count) example shown as a function of system reliability (0.98) and     
 98% probability of success of controlling failures to 1 or less per event in time (16 hours) 
2,000
16
1
1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 5,000 10,000 21,250
0.940
0.945
0.950
0.955
0.960
0.965
0.970
0.975
0.980
0.985
0.990
And:
System 
Reliability 
( R )
System 
MTBF
Element 
Failure Rate 
(λi)
258.6 1.9336E-06 0.99953 0.99896 0.99816 0.99716 0.98920 0.96096 0.85885
282.8 1.7678E-06 0.99961 0.99913 0.99846 0.99761 0.99089 0.96680 0.87775
311.9 1.6029E-06 0.99968 0.99928 0.99873 0.99803 0.99245 0.97223 0.89586
347.5 1.4389E-06 0.99974 0.99942 0.99897 0.99841 0.99386 0.97724 0.91305
391.9 1.2757E-06 0.99979 0.99954 0.99919 0.99874 0.99513 0.98180 0.92918
449.1 1.1133E-06 0.99984 0.99965 0.99938 0.99904 0.99626 0.98590 0.94411
525.3 9.5185E-07 0.99989 0.99974 0.99955 0.99929 0.99724 0.98952 0.95767
632.0 7.9118E-07 0.99992 0.99982 0.99968 0.99951 0.99808 0.99263 0.96970
792.0 6.3133E-07 0.99995 0.99989 0.99980 0.99969 0.99877 0.99523 0.98001
1,058.6 4.7230E-07 0.99997 0.99994 0.99989 0.99982 0.99930 0.99728 0.98841
1,592.0 3.1407E-07 0.99999 0.99997 0.99995 0.99992 0.99969 0.99878 0.99469
IF: Proposed System Has Serial Element Count (N) =
Mission Time (t) =
Mission's Maximum Failure Count (r) = 
Then: Probability Of Success: Failure Count Is r Or Less During t For Various System Complexity Levels (Nref) Based On λi 
 
 
Table 7. Availability shown highlighted as a function of system reliability and mean time to repair in hours 
 
 Availability (A) = Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) / (MTBF + Mean Time To Repair (MTTR))
 A = MTBF / (MTBF+MTTR)     or     MTTR = MTBF(1-A / A)           t = 16
2,000
Hours
N =
A family of curves can be created for A = 99% to 99.999% with Sys. Reliability (R) = 0.90 to 0.99999
Then MTTR is calculated @ each A value 
72.00% 98.50% 99.00% 99.50% 99.90% 99.95% 99.99%
1.00E-07 1,944.44            76.14               50.51               25.13              5.01             2.50            0.50              5,000.00
1.00E-06 194.44               7.61                 5.05                 2.51                0.50             0.25            0.05              500.00
1.50E-06 129.63               5.08                 3.37                 1.68                0.33             0.17            0.03              333.33
1.00E-05 19.44                 0.76                 0.51                 0.25                0.05             0.03            0.01              50.00
1.50E-05 12.96                 0.51                 0.34                 0.17                0.03             0.02            0.00              33.33
1.00E-04 1.94                   0.08                 0.05                 0.03                0.01             0.00            0.00              5.00
1.50E-04 1.30                   0.05                 0.03                 0.02                0.00             0.00            0.00              3.33
1.00E-03 0.19                   0.01                 0.01               0.00              0.00           0.00          0.00              0.50
Element Failure 
Rate (גi)
MTBF =
1 / N*גi
Availability (A)
MTTR (Hours)  
C. An example of long term In-Space Application 
 Let us now look at an example of long-term exposure in space without the opportunity to provide re-supply of 
any hardware from earth. This might be considered as a trip to another planet like Mars where trip time may be 
approximately two years. First, we must develop the reliability and maintainability requirements for this application 
of ~ 17,600 hour mission. We will choose a desired system reliability of 0.98 with an availability of 99.99%. We can 
see from Table 8 that our upper-bound MTTR will be ~ 87 hours. However, we can be see from Table 9 that the 
total parts count must be constrained from 2000 to 4000 (reliability of 0.98 to 0.99) critical parts if we assume there 
are no failures allowed (Availability of 100%) and at a probability of success of 98% or better. But allowing for our 
availability goal of 99.99% with 5 or less failures, we can see from Table 10 that our probability of success is ~ 
100% based on using parts with an element-failure rate of 5.7394E-10. 
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 Table 8. Availability shown highlighted as a function of system reliability and mean time to repair in 
               hours 
 Availability (A) = Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) / (MTBF + Mean Time To Repair (MTTR))
 A = MTBF / (MTBF+MTTR)     or     MTTR = MTBF(1-A / A)           t = 17600 Hours
A family of curves can be created for A = 99% to 99.999% with Sys. Reliability (R) = 0.90 to 0.99999
Then MTTR is calculated @ each A value 
99.000% 99.500% 99.900% 99.950% 99.990% 99.995% 99.999%
0.90000 1,687.33            839.42             167.21             83.56              16.71           8.35            1.67              167,045.50
0.95000 3,465.91            1,724.25          343.47             171.65            34.32           17.16          3.43              343,124.77
0.98000 8,799.70            4,377.74          872.04             435.80            87.13           43.56          8.71              871,170.37
0.99000 17,688.74          8,799.93          1,752.94          876.03            175.14         87.56          17.51            1,751,185.26
0.99500 35,466.59          17,644.18        3,514.71          1,756.47         351.15         175.57        35.11            3,511,192.65
0.99990 1,777,688.89     884,377.89      176,167.37      88,039.62       17,600.88    8,800.00     1,759.93       175,991,199.85
0.99995 3,555,466.67     1,768,800.00   352,343.54      176,083.64     35,202.64    17,600.44   3,519.95       351,991,199.93
0.99999 17,777,688.89   8,844,176.88   1,761,752.95   880,435.82   176,016.72 88,003.96 17,600.09    1,759,991,199.99
System
Reliability 
MTBF =
 -t/ln R
Availability (A)
MTTR (Hours)  
 
Table 9. System Complexity (parts count) example shown as a function of system reliability at (0.98 to  
 0.99) and 98%  probability of success of controlling failures to 0 per event in time; however, the 
 event time is long term in space of 2 years (17,600 hours). 
2,000
17,600
0
1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 4,000 10,000 20,000
0.940
0.945
0.950
0.955
0.960
0.965
0.970
0.975
0.980
0.985
0.990
 
And:
System 
Reliability 
( R )
 System 
MTBF
Element 
Failure Rate 
(λi)
284,442.6 1.7578E-09 0.96954 0.95465 0.94000 0.92557 0.88360 0.73390 0.53862
311,117.0 1.6071E-09 0.97211 0.95846 0.94500 0.93173 0.89303 0.75363 0.56796
343,124.8 1.4572E-09 0.97468 0.96226 0.95000 0.93790 0.90250 0.77378 0.59874
382,243.6 1.3081E-09 0.97724 0.96606 0.95500 0.94407 0.91203 0.79436 0.63101
431,140.1 1.1597E-09 0.97980 0.96985 0.96000 0.95025 0.92160 0.81537 0.66483
494,004.9 1.0121E-09 0.98234 0.97363 0.96500 0.95644 0.93123 0.83683 0.70028
577,822.0 8.6532E-10 0.98489 0.97741 0.97000 0.96264 0.94090 0.85873 0.73742
695,162.9 7.1926E-10 0.98742 0.98119 0.97500 0.96885 0.95063 0.88110 0.77633
871,170.4 5.7394E-10 0.98995 0.98496 0.98000 0.97506 0.96040 0.90392 0.81707
1,164,511.2 4.2936E-10 0.99247 0.98873 0.98500 0.98129 0.97023 0.92722 0.85973
1,751,185.3 2.8552E-10 0.99499 0.99249 0.99000 0.98752 0.98010 0.95099 0.90438
IF: Proposed System Has Serial Element Count (N) =
Mission Time (t) =
Mission's Maximum Failure Count (r) =
Then: Probability Of Success: Failure Count Is r Or Less During t For Various System Complexity Levels (Nref) Based On λi 
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Table 10. System Complexity (parts count) example shown as a function of system reliability at 0.98 and ~ 
  100%  probability of success of controlling failures to 5 or less per event in time; however, the    
event time is long term in space of 2 years (17,600 hours). 
 
2,000
17,600
5
1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 5,000 10,000 20,000
0.940
0.945
0.950
0.955
0.960
0.965
0.970
0.975
0.980
0.985
0.990
And:
System 
Reliability 
( R )
System 
MTBF
Element 
Failure Rate 
(λi)
284,442.6 1.7578E-09 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 0.99995
311,117.0 1.6071E-09 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 0.99997
343,124.8 1.4572E-09 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 0.99998
382,243.6 1.3081E-09 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 0.99999
431,140.1 1.1597E-09 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
494,004.9 1.0121E-09 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
577,822.0 8.6532E-10 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
695,162.9 7.1926E-10 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
871,170.4 5.7394E-10 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
1,164,511.2 4.2936E-10 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
1,751,185.3 2.8552E-10 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
IF: Proposed System Has Serial Element Count (N) =
Mission Time (t) =
Mission's Maximum Failure Count (r) = 
Then: Probability Of Success: Failure Count Is r Or Less During t For Various System Complexity Levels (Nref) Based On λi 
 
 
 We have discovered these element-failure rates are most likely not achievable; therefore, we will address this 
subject from another perspective. Using Table 11 we will assume a 2000-serial-element count for this example and a 
list of reasonable element-failure rates to determine the System MTBF and our probability for success of achieving 
98% or better for this 17,600 hour (~ 2 years) mission when allowing 100 or less failures to occur. When 
considering a mission of this type, consideration should be given to accessibility to perform repairs; therefore, we 
should limit the capability to perform the repair (MTTR) in 2 hours maximum as a design requirement. Using Table 
12 we can see that the availability can be lowered to 72% to accommodate this 2 hour each repair) requirement 
while allowing for repairing up to 100 elements (parts) during the mission. 
 
Table 11. System Complexity (parts count) example shown as a function of element-failure rate (part 
 reliability) at (1.0E-03 to 1.0E-8) and 98% probability of success of controlling failures to 100 or 
 less per event in time; however, the event time is long term in space of 2 years (17,600 hours). 
2,000
17,600
100
100 300 400 500 2,000 3,000 4,627
1.0000E-03
1.5000E-04
1.0000E-04
4.0000E-05
1.5000E-05
1.0000E-05
1.5000E-06
1.0000E-06
1.5000E-07
1.0000E-07
1.0000E-08
And:
Element 
Failure Rate 
(λi)
 System MTBF System Reliability
0.5 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
3.3 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
5.0 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
12.5 0.00000 0.99965 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
33.3 0.00000 1.00000 0.98968 0.31419 0.00220 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
50.0 0.00000 1.00000 1.00000 0.99965 0.90660 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
333.3 0.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 0.98968 0.02242
500.0 0.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 0.98007
3,333.3 0.00509 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
5,000.0 0.02960 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
50,000.0 0.70328 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
IF: Proposed System Has Serial Element Count (N) =
Mission Time (t) =
Mission's Maximum Failure Count (r) = 
Then: Probability Of Success: Failure Count Is r Or Less During t For Various System Complexity Levels (Nref) Based On λi 
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 Table 12. Availability shown highlighted as a function of Element-failure rate ( גB i) and mean time repair   
    in hours 
 Availability (A) = Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) / (MTBF + Mean Time To Repair (MTTR))
 A = MTBF / (MTBF+MTTR)     or     MTTR = MTBF(1-A / A)           t = 17600
2000
Hours
N =
A family of curves can be created for A = 99% to 99.999% with Sys. Reliability (R) = 0.90 to 0.99999
Then MTTR is calculated @ each A value 
72.00% 98.50% 99.00% 99.50% 99.90% 99.95% 99.99%
1.00E-07 1,944.44            76.14               50.51               25.13              5.01             2.50            0.50              5,000.00
1.00E-06 194.44               7.61                 5.05                 2.51                0.50             0.25            0.05              500.00
1.50E-06 129.63               5.08                 3.37                 1.68                0.33             0.17            0.03              333.33
1.00E-05 19.44                 0.76                 0.51                 0.25                0.05             0.03            0.01              50.00
1.50E-05 12.96                 0.51                 0.34                 0.17                0.03             0.02            0.00              33.33
1.00E-04 1.94                   0.08                 0.05                 0.03                0.01             0.00            0.00              5.00
1.50E-04 1.30                   0.05                 0.03                 0.02                0.00             0.00            0.00              3.33
1.00E-03 0.19                   0.01                 0.01               0.00              0.00           0.00          0.00              0.50
Element Failure 
Rate (גi)
MTBF =
1 / N*גi
Availability (A)
MTTR (Hours)  
 
IV. Conclusion 
The availability requirement must be worked by addressing the MTBF requirement, MTTR requirement, and the 
constraint on the number of critical-system elements (critical-parts count) for the system being designed. These 
requirements must be developed together and managed through out the design process with the understanding of 
their relationships. If a design-analysis-capability analysis such as the one discussed in this paper or the use of 
today’s reliability and maintainability tools are used in the design, development, and evaluation (DDT&E) phase, 
the availability requirement, the MTTR requirement, the MTBF requirement, probability of success, affordability, 
and safety can all be controlled by design. However, because of their relationships to each other, availability, 
reliability, maintainability, and total parts count must be worked and developed together to provide the correct 
understanding and control to meet all of the objectives. They also must be performed during concept development 
and available as requirement input before proceeding with the detailed design. 
Additional benefits can be achieved by selecting the best technologies that provide major reductions in total parts 
count. An example would be to select a direct-electro-mechanical control instead of using an intermediate fluid to 
perform the function while using the electro-mechanical device to control the intermediate fluid (e.g., electro-
mechanical valve controlling fluid flow versus. a hydraulic or pneumatic operated valve while using a solenoid 
valve to control the hydraulic or pneumatic fluid which then controls the fluid valve. The use of common fluids for 
propulsion applications allowing an integrated system solution with only one fluid container would provide a major 
reduction in total parts count). When the criticality drives the design to provide redundant hardware solutions, the 
selection of hardware should always be at the best element reliability possible to provide the lowest maintenance 
burden for lowering life-cycle costs. In the provided example, additional benefits, the resultant DDT&E and 
operational cost will be reduced along with the achievement of the highest overall system reliability and safety and 
can achieve a higher availability of the system enabling mission success. 
In summary, system-development work that focuses on inherent reliability, MTBF with an emphasis on parts 
count, and maintainability will improve performance, safety, and operational affordability. Performance is improved 
when fewer and better parts are used as well as provide the additional benefit of less weight. Safety is improved as 
hardware that does not fail during integration, checkout, and servicing inevitably will perform better in actual use. 
Affordability is also improved with every improvement in inherent reliability, maintainability, and focusing on 
reduced parts count as better overall performance makes each flight more productive and allows for additional 
flights due to shorter process or production intervals. Ultimately, hardware that fails during processing, regardless of 
redundancies, will not function well in a long flight. All that is lacking for improved technology is the investment 
up-front (e.g., focus on improved generic technology that numerous subsequent users can take advantage of to 
justify their initial investment, such as the example of selecting the best technologies mention above). This payback 
could be across the entire economic growth perspective and not limited to a single system use. 
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